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3.  Venture capitalism as a mechanism 
for knowledge governance1
Cristiano Antonelli and Morris Teubal
1. INTRODUCTION
New dedicated capital markets specialized in the public transactions of the 
stocks of ‘science- based companies’ emerged in the USA during the 1970s. 
These new fi nancial markets enable the anticipation of returns stemming 
from the economic applications of technological knowledge, bundled with 
managerial competence, but non- embodied in either capital or intermedi-
ary goods. As such the fi nancial markets have, for the fi rst time in history, 
promoted the creation and growth of a specialized segment of ‘inventor’ 
companies and favored public transactions in technological knowledge as 
an activity per se.
These new fi nancial markets are becoming a key component of an 
innovation- driven novel institutional system termed ‘venture capital-
ism’. This is key for a new model of ‘knowledge- based’ growth relevant 
not only for information and communication technologies but also for 
 biotechnologies and new radical technologies at large (Perez, 2003).
As such, venture capitalism can be considered a major institutional 
innovation that enables higher levels of knowledge governance. The basic 
‘innovation’ here is not technological but rather institutional, as it consists 
in a new hybrid organization based upon the bundling of knowledge, 
fi nance and competence into new science- based startup fi rms and in the 
trade of their knowledge- intensive property rights in dedicated institu-
tional fi nancial markets (Hodgson, 1998; Menard, 2000, 2004; Menard 
and Shirley, 2005).
In order to grasp the process that has led to its introduction we shall 
rely upon the complexity approach to the economics of innovation. The 
application of the tools of complex system dynamics to the economics of 
innovation enables us to analyze the role of new multi- agent structures 
such as the new fi nancial markets characterized by higher- level organiza-
tions. These ‘higher levels of organization’ in fact are forms of organized 
complexity that favor the generation and dissemination of technological 
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knowledge into economic systems. Specifi cally venture capitalism can be 
considered a major institutional innovation that provides a platform for the 
more eff ective exploitation of technological knowledge bringing together 
into a coalition for innovation a variety of complementary players such 
as ‘inventors’, venture capital companies, managerial skills and invest-
ment funds, large incumbents searching for new sources of technological 
knowledge and families looking for new fi nancial assets, and stirring their 
participation and active contribution to a collective undertaking (Lane, 
1993; Lane and Maxfi eld, 2005; Antonelli, 2008; Lane et al., 2009).
This work elaborates the view that venture capitalism has improved 
the governance of technological knowledge within economic systems, 
and hence has reshaped the prime mechanism by which the generation of 
new knowledge can lead to economic growth (Nelson, 1994, 1995; Quéré, 
2004).
The rest of the work is organized as follows. Section 2 and 3 provide the 
analytical background. Specifi cally, Section 2 provides the basic econom-
ics of the relationship between fi nance and innovation, and highlights the 
advantages of the new fi nancial markets in providing funds to science-
 based startup companies with respect to previous institutional arrange-
ments such as banks and incumbent corporations. Section 3 explores 
the basic elements of the economics of markets as economic institutions. 
Section 4 shows the complexity of interactions that led to the emergence of 
the new fi nancial markets. The conclusions highlight the main results.
2.  FINANCE AND INNOVATION: THE 
FRAMEWORK
Knowledge as an economic good exhibits major limitations in terms of 
radical uncertainty, non- divisibility, non- excludability, non- exhaustibility, 
non- appropriability and non- rivalry in use. Much economic analysis has 
explored the implications with respect to the tradability of knowledge 
(Arrow, 1962). Yet the limitations of knowledge as an economic good 
have major implications also in terms of the provision of fi nance to fund 
its generation and use.
Major asymmetries shape the interaction between prospective funders 
and prospective innovators. The access to fi nancial markets for innovative 
projects is seriously limited by the radical uncertainty that characterizes 
both the generation and the exploitation of new knowledge. Prospective 
lenders and investors are worried by the combined high levels of risk: (1) 
that the activities that have been funded with their own money will not 
succeed, and (2) that the new knowledge, occasionally generated, will 
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not be appropriated by the inventor, at least to an extent that makes it 
possible to repay the credits and remunerate the capital invested. Even in 
the case of a successful generation, funders have good reasons to worry 
about dissipation stemming from uncontrolled leakages of proprietary 
knowledge. As a consequence, worthy inventive activities and innovative 
projects risk being jeopardized because of the lack of fi nancial resources 
(Hall, 2002).
Stiglitz has provided two fundamental tools to analyze the relationship 
between fi nance and innovation. With the fi rst stream of contributions, 
Stiglitz (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Stiglitz, 1985) has shown that equity 
fi nance has an important advantage over debt in the provision of funds to 
innovative undertakings because investors have the right to claim a share 
of the profi ts of successful companies. While lenders can claim only their 
credits, investors can participate to the bottom tail of the highly skewed 
distribution of positive returns stemming from the generation of new 
knowledge and the introduction of new technologies. This has important 
consequences in terms of reduction of both the risks of credit rationing 
and the costs of fi nancial resources for research activities. Lenders need 
to charge high interest rates in order to compensate for the risks of failure 
and to discriminate among new research activities to avoid as many 
‘lemons’ as possible. Equity investors instead fi nd an equilibrium rate of 
return at much lower levels because they can participate in the huge profi ts 
of a small fraction of the new ventures. The fraction of lemons that equity 
can support is much larger than that of debt, hence fi nancial equity can 
provide a much larger amount of funding for research activities.
With a second line of analysis, Stiglitz (Sah and Stiglitz, 1986, 1988) 
has provided the distinction between hierarchies and polyarchies as 
alternative mechanisms to manage diff erent types of risk. Hierarchical 
decision- making is better able to avoid the funding of bad projects. Yet 
the ability of hierarchies is limited by the scope of their competence: their 
decision- making tends to favor minor, incremental changes. Polyarchic 
decision- making, on the other hand, experiences higher risks of including 
bad projects, for example Type 1 errors, but yields higher chances of inclu-
sion of outstanding projects. According to Stiglitz, hierarchical decision-
 making fi ts better in economic environments characterized by low levels of 
entropy and radical uncertainty. Conversely, polyarchic decision- making 
applies better in times when the levels of radical uncertainty are higher.
The distinction between Type 1 and Type 2 errors proves very useful in 
assessing the working of alternative mechanisms and forms of decision-
 making in the selection and implementation of new technological knowl-
edge. The argument elaborated by Stiglitz can be used upside- down so 
as to investigate what type of decision- making yields higher results in 
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terms of the generation of new technological knowledge and the eventual 
 introduction of innovations.
Hierarchies are more likely to incur Type 2 errors that arise when good 
innovative projects are excluded. Hence hierarchical decision- making 
has higher chances of favoring incremental innovations and to excluding 
innovative undertakings that are disruptive and may engender problems 
in terms of discontinuities both with respect to the existing knowledge 
base and sunk costs. Polyarchic decision- making, based on a variety of 
competences, selected on a professional basis according to their expertise, 
and less exposed to vested interests, on the contrary, favors the inclusion 
of a wider range of projects. As a consequence, polyarchies tend to include 
also bad projects. But the likelihood that outstanding projects are retained 
is much higher. The occurrence of radical innovations seems higher with 
polyarchic architectures.
The combination and implementation of the two tools provided by 
Stiglitz enable the comparative assessment of the alternative institutional 
mechanisms designed to handle the relationship between fi nance and inno-
vation, and identifi ed by Schumpeter: banks and corporations. The analy-
sis of their limitations, with the tools provided by Stiglitz, enables us to 
identify the emerging venture capitalism as a third distinctive mechanism.
In his Theory of Economic Development, Schumpeter stresses the central 
role of the provision of appropriate fi nancial resources to entrepreneurs. 
The natural interface of the entrepreneur, as a matter of fact, is the innova-
tive banker. The banker is innovative when he is able to spot new oppor-
tunities and select among the myriad of business proposals that are daily 
submitted, those that have higher chances of getting through the system. 
With a given quantity of fi nancial resources, the innovative banker should 
be able to reduce the fl ow of funds towards traditional activities and 
switch them towards the new fi rms. The innovative banker should be able 
to identify the obsolete incumbents that are going to be forced to exit by 
the creative destruction that follows the entry of successful innovators.
Banks can be considered much closer to polyarchic decision- making. 
They can rely upon a variety of expertise and competence, hired on a 
professional basis. Their competence is much less constrained by a given 
scope of expertise, and the eff ects of irreversibilities and vested interests 
are much lower. As such, banks seem better able to avoid Type 2 errors. 
Banks have a clear advantage in the screening process, but their action is 
limited by clear disadvantages in the participation in the profi ts stemming 
from new innovative undertakings. Banks are exposed to the intrinsic 
asymmetry between debt and equity in the provision of funds to innova-
tive undertakings. This is true especially when radical innovations occur. 
The higher the discontinuity brought about by radical innovations, the 
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larger the risks of failure of new companies. Banks bear the risks of the 
failure of fi rms that had access to their fi nancial support but cannot share 
the benefi ts of radical breakthroughs. As Schumpeter himself realized, 
this model, although practiced with much success in Germany in the last 
decades of the nineteenth century, suff ered from the severe limitations 
brought about by this basic asymmetry.
Schumpeter not only realized the limits of the fi rst model but identifi ed 
the new model emerging in the US economy at the beginning of the twen-
tieth century. The analysis of the corporation as the institutional alterna-
tive to the ‘innovative banker’ has been laid down in Capitalism, Socialism 
and Democracy. Here Schumpeter identifi es the large corporation as the 
driving institution for the introduction of innovations. His analysis of 
the corporation as an innovative institutional approach to improving the 
relationship between fi nance and innovation has received less attention 
than other facets (King and Levine, 1993). The internal markets of the 
Schumpeterian corporation substitute external fi nancial markets in the 
key role of the eff ective provision and correct allocation of funds combin-
ing fi nancial resources and entrepreneurial vision within competent hierar-
chies. Corporations, however, are much less able to manage the screening 
process. Internal vested interests and localized technological knowledge 
help reduce the risks of funding bad projects but risk reducing the chances 
that radical innovations are funded.
The Schumpeterian corporation confi rms that equity fi nance is more 
eff ective than debt fi nance for channeling resources towards innovative 
undertakings, but with a substantial bias characterized by continuity with 
the existing knowledge base. The model of fi nance for innovation based 
upon the corporation ranks higher than the model based upon banks in 
that equity fi nance is more effi  cient than debt- based fi nance with respect 
to risk- sharing, but has its own limitations arising from the reduction of 
the centers able to handle the decision- making and the ensuing reduction 
of the scope of competence that fi lters new undertakings.
In the second part of the twentieth century a few corporations con-
centrated worldwide a large part of the provision of fi nance for innova-
tion. The limited span of competence of a small and decreasing number 
of incumbents became less and less able to identify and implement new 
radical technologies: a case of lock- in competence could be observed. The 
corporation has been able for a large proportion of the twentieth century 
to fulfi ll the pivotal role of intermediary between fi nance and innovations, 
but with a strong bias in favor of incremental technological change. The 
screening capabilities of corporations fail to appreciate radical novelties.
The integration of these two strands of analysis highlights the radical mis-
match between the distinctive competence and the competitive advantage 
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of the two traditional modes of provision of fi nancial resources to innova-
tion. Both in equity and debt fi nance, exploitation conditions on the one 
hand and competence on the other, are not aligned and are actually diver-
gent. Banks, as polyarchies, are better able to identify and fund radical 
innovations but cannot participate into their extraprofi ts, as they provide 
debt and not equity. On the contrary they are exposed to the high rates of 
failures stemming from type 1 errors, for example, the higher incidence 
of ‘lemons’ into their portfolios of funded projects. Corporate provision 
of funds to internal R&D projects selected by internal and hierarchical 
decision- making is less inclined to identifying and funding radical innova-
tions that would benefi t larger fi rms as equity providers. Corporations are 
better able to fund minor, incremental innovations where their competi-
tive advantage in exploitation is lesser because the latter are less likely to 
earn extraprofi ts. This misalignment between the distinctive exploitation 
conditions and the intrinsic competence of the two traditional institutions 
has the clear eff ect of reducing the incentives to the provision of funds for 
innovation, and of increasing the interest rates for debt fi nance. Together 
with the limits of knowledge as an economic good, this institutional mis-
alignment is one of the main causes of underinvestment in the generation 
of technological knowledge and hence undersupply of innovations.
A mechanism based upon a screening procedure performed by compe-
tent polyarchies and the equity- based provision of fi nance to new under-
takings would clearly combine the best aspects of each model. Venture 
capitalism seems more and more likely to emerge as the third major insti-
tutional set- up able to manage the complex interplay between fi nance and 
innovation when radical changes take place. As a matter of fact, venture 
capitalism combines the advantages of distributed processing typical of 
polyarchies with the advantages of equity- based fi nance over debt- based 
fi nance. Venture capitalism makes it possible to combine the more eff ec-
tive identifi cation of radical innovations with the more eff ective sharing of 
risks associated with the provision of funds.
Table 3.1 provides a synthetic account of the analysis conducted so 
far. The bank- based provision of funds to innovation suff ers the limits 
of debt- based fi nance but ranks higher in terms of distributed processing. 
The advantages of distributed processing are larger, the larger the number 
of banks, and the larger the number of independent agents that participate 
in the screening process. The corporation model is less able to avoid Type 
2 errors but enjoys the advantages of the equity- based provision of fi nance 
to innovation. The corporation model suff ers especially from the grip of 
the past that sunk costs and the irreversibilities of tangible and intangible 
capital exert upon the appreciation of new disruptive technologies. It is 
also clear that the smaller the number of corporations that control the 
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funding of innovative undertaking, the higher the risks of Type 2 errors at 
the system level. Venture capitalism seems able to combine the advantages 
of the corporation model in terms of equity- based provision of funds for 
innovation, with the distributed processing typical of the banking system.
The emergence of the new, dedicated fi nancial markets specialized in 
the public transactions of the knowledge- intensive property rights of new 
science- based startup companies is a key aspect of venture capitalism. As 
such it requires a dedicated analysis.2
In order to grasp the emergence of the new fi nancial markets specialized 
in the transactions of knowledge- intensive property rights, it is necessary 
to revisit the basic elements of the economics of markets.
3. MARKETS AS ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS
Markets as an Economic Problem
Markets are economic institutions that emerge when an appropriate com-
bination of complementary conditions occurs. Markets are the product 
of social and institutional change. As such, they evolve over time: they 
Table 3.1  Limits and advantages of alternative fi nancial systems for 
innovations
Polyarchies Hierarchies
Debt fi nance Banks experience more 
type 1 errors funding bad 
projects because of low 
competence levels but 
favor the introduction 
of radical innovations; 
as lenders however they 
cannot participate into their 
extrapprofi ts
Equity fi nance Venture capitalism favor 
the introduction of radical 
innovations and participate 
into the fat tails of profi ts of 
new ventures
Corporations can participate 
into the fat tail of profi ts of new 
ventures, and are better able to 
sort out bad projects, but are 
limited by higher probability to 
commit type 2 errors reducing 
the rate of introduction of 
radical innovations
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can decline and emerge. At each point in time, markets diff er. Markets 
can be classifi ed according to their characteristics and their functionality. 
The emergence and upgrading of a market is the result of an articulated 
 institutional process that deserves to be analyzed carefully.
There are three basic notions of market in the literature: (1) in the 
textbook theory of exchange, markets exist and are self- evident; and 
any transaction presupposes the existence of an underlying market; (2) 
markets as devices for reducing transaction costs (Coase); (3) markets as 
social institutions promoting division of labor, innovation and economic 
growth.
A major contribution to the discussion of markets comes from Coase 
whose work clarifi es both (1) and (2) above. ‘In mainstream economic 
theory the fi rm and the market are for the most part assumed to exist and 
are not themselves the subject of investigation’ (Coase, 1988, p. 5; italics 
added). By mainstream economic theory Coase means an economic theory 
without transaction costs. Transaction costs are the costs of market trans-
actions that include ‘search and information costs, bargaining and deci-
sion costs, and policing and enforcement costs’ (Dahlman, 1979, quoted 
by Coase), which, of course, includes the costs of contracting. In Coase’s 
theory, transaction costs exist and can be important; and they explain the 
existence of the fi rm.3
In the old neoclassical theory of exchange that Coase refers to, the exist-
ence of markets (and also the creation of new markets) is assumed but not 
analyzed. It is an axiom, a self- evident truth, similar to Coase’s criticism of 
the notion of consumer utility, which is central to the above theory: ‘a non 
existing entity which plays a part similar, I suspect, to that of ether in the 
old physics’ (Coase, 1988, p. 2; italics added). This view of markets implies 
that any transaction assumes an underlying market, or that there is no 
such thing as a transaction without a market. This is not only not correct 
but, following Coase or the implications of his analysis, we assert that the 
distinction between individual transactions and a market is important.4
For our purposes, markets are social institutions where at least a critical 
mass of producers and a critical mass of consumers interact and transact. 
There is an important element of collective interaction and of collective 
transacting; that is, any one transaction takes into account the conditions 
of all other transactions.
From this viewpoint a market contrasts with an institutional context 
characterized by three relevant conditions. First, it is a lower set of trans-
actions than that of the subsequent market. Second, transactions are iso-
lated and sporadic, both synchronically and diachronically. Third, agents 
do not rely upon exchanges but on self- suffi  ciency; that is, users produce 
the products they consume/use.
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Originally markets were defi ned only in geographical terms as locations 
where a large number of sellers and buyers would meet to trade. Since 
then, markets have grown into sophisticated institutions characterized by 
an array of functions and characteristics.5 The extent to which the process 
has grown diff ers. Diff erent stratifi cations of institutional evolution can 
be found according to the characteristics of products and agents involved 
(Menard, 2004). Markets diff er across countries, industries and contexts. 
Markets diff er according to the functions they can perform and their 
structural characteristics. The emergence and evolution of markets is the 
result of a process that takes place over time and is shaped by institutional 
innovations of diff erent kinds.
Towards a Classifi cation of Markets
Markets have properties and characteristics. According to such character-
istics, markets are more or less able to perform their functions. The prop-
erties of markets do not coincide with the properties of the products being 
exchanged and the characteristics of agents engaged in trade. Yet there is 
a high degree of overlap between the characteristics of the products and 
agents and the properties of the markets.
The reputation of agents is an essential condition for the emergence 
and the working of markets. The certifi cation of agents and the ex ante 
assessment of their reliability and sustainability provide both tentative 
customers and suppliers with information necessary to perform transac-
tions. Without the provision of information about the reliability of part-
ners in trade, both customers and suppliers must bear the costly burden of 
relevant search and assessment activities. From the viewpoint of the eff ec-
tive working of the marketplace, moreover, the symmetric distribution of 
reputation, as a carrier of information, plays a key role. It is clear that in 
a system where reputation is distributed unevenly, transactions are likely 
to privilege the few agents that enjoy the advantages of good reputation. 
A star system is likely to emerge, with clear monopolistic eff ects. Systems 
where the reputation of agents is certifi ed are likely to work better than 
systems where reputation is asymmetrically distributed. The latter systems, 
in turn, perform better than systems where average levels of reputation are 
low. Reputation is a key element in the defi nition of social capital precisely 
for its positive eff ects in terms of reduction of transaction costs.
Products diff er widely with respect to their characteristics, and exhibit 
diff erent levels of general tradability and hence infl uence the performances 
of the corresponding markets with respect to the number and quality of 
the functions provided to the rest of the system.
In this context it is consequently clear that a central property is the 
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category of products that are being exchanged. We can identify markets 
built around a specifi c need category or user segment (encompassing many 
diff erent products and technologies); and markets built around a particu-
lar industry or segment of producers (encompassing many user segments 
and need categories). In the fi rst profi le of a market, users of substitute 
products relating to the satisfaction of a basic category of need converge; 
in the second, producers of products related to a basic set of technologies 
converge. In the former market, the products traded are substitutes on the 
demand side. In the latter market, defi ned by a particular producer tech-
nology category, for example the chemical industry, the products traded 
are substitutes on the supply side.
Beyond the characteristics of the products being exchanged in the 
marketplace, and of agents engaged in trade, we can identify at least 
six main characteristics of markets: the time horizon of markets plays a 
central role. Spot markets are far less eff ective than regular markets. In 
eff ective markets, future prices can be identifi ed and a full intertemporal 
string of prices and quantities can be set. Market density is defi ned by the 
number of agents both on the demand and on the supply side. It is clear 
that markets with one player either on the demand or the supply side are 
highly imperfect. Market thickness is relevant both on the demand and 
the supply side with respect to the volume of transactions. With respect 
to thickness, there is an important issue about the levels of the critical 
mass necessary for a good performance of the market. When transactions 
take place with high levels of frequency, the users of markets, both on the 
demand and the supply side, and prices and quantities can adjust swiftly to 
changing economic conditions. Sporadic transactions limit the perform-
ances of markets. Recurrence of transactions is most important to reduce 
opportunistic behavior and to make comparisons possible. Recurrence of 
transactions is a major source of transparency and hence information. The 
concentration of transactions increases the density, thickness, frequency 
and recurrence of transactions: as such it can be enforced by means of 
compulsory interventions, or emerge as the consequence of a spontaneous 
process. The role of concentration is vital for the emergence of new eff ec-
tive markets, and hence it is at the same time a prerequisite and a threshold 
factor.
The Functions of Markets
Markets diff er greatly with respect to their characteristics, and as a conse-
quence with respect to the functions they can perform. A well- functioning 
market is able to perform a variety of functions that a set of isolated 
 transactions cannot. At least four basic functions can be identifi ed:
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1  Markets as signaling mechanisms to actual or potential users or 
suppliers/producers
Markets with appropriate levels of thickness and robustness signal to the 
rest of the economy the need for the specifi c products being traded; and 
that the need- satisfying category of good not only exists but is traded and 
therefore accessible. The signaling involves a qualitative dimension (the 
‘need’ and the ‘product class’ satisfying it) and a quantitative dimension 
refl ected in quantities and values purchased and sold. Existence of a market 
also minimizes volatility and swings concerning persistence of the ‘need’ or 
possibility of obtaining the good. This is because a market or an industry 
operating in it is presumably more stable than a single user or a single fi rm; 
and a market – compared to a single transaction – provides relative assur-
ance about the possibility of repetitive transactions, purchases or sales, in 
the future. Signaling existence and persistence of need to be satisfi ed and 
product class to be supplied helps any fi rm/supplier and any user/ consumer 
respectively, actual or potential, to focus his or her search process on 
the relevant space where the market exists or operates. It also facilitates 
users’ (producers’) long- run decisions concerning purchase (sale) of a new 
particular product class or service or system traded in a particular market 
(‘the product’). The decisions involve investment decisions concerning or 
involving the product or its supply. Nobody wants to create dependence 
on a product purchased (sold) whose sources of supply (demand) and 
mechanisms of purchase (sale) are not highly reliable and stable.6
2 Markets as selection and incentive mechanisms
Markets are able to perform relevant screening functions when many dif-
ferent products, manufactured with diff erent technologies, are being con-
fronted. Best products emerge and lower- quality products are screened. 
The extent to which selection is dynamically effi  cient depends on charac-
teristics of users, for example on whether or not users are willing or not 
to take risks in trying novel products. It also depends on characteristics of 
producers, for example whether they are innovative or not and whether 
or not competition (as a process) among producers both generates variety 
and leads individual fi rms to rapidly adapt and improve their products in 
response to other fi rms’ products. Good selection mechanisms enable the 
allocation of eff ective incentives to agents, via entry, expansion and inven-
tion/innovation, and symmetrically exit when losses emerge both on the 
demand and the supply side.
3 Markets as coordination mechanisms
By means of their signaling functions, markets make possible coordi-
nation in the production of complementary products. Specialization 
M2283 - VIALE TXT.indd   108 20/4/10   10:14:06
 Venture capitalism and knowledge governance  109
of agents in the narrow spectrum of activities where each fi rm has a 
competitive advantage can be done by means of effi  cient markets. This 
because in the market all the relevant users are present, so that a fi rm 
can easily know the potential market for that specifi c component (or 
components) in the production of which it enjoys a competitive advan-
tage (it will also save on selling costs). The mechanisms in operation 
seem to be: signaling and selection with interactive learning. More gen-
erally, markets facilitate both specialization and integration by produc-
ers. Moreover, markets also provide integration opportunities on the 
demand side: they facilitate integration and specialization of users that 
can combine specialized products into more elaborated consumption 
and usage.
4 Markets as risk management mechanisms
By reducing transaction costs and through the enhancement of variety of 
fi rms and products, some markets (as opposed to transactions without 
markets) make possible the distribution of risks across a variety of fi rms 
and products. Hence they reduce the risks of opportunistic behavior and 
information and knowledge asymmetries.
Only a few markets can reach all the necessary levels of time horizon, 
density, thickness, frequency, recurrence and concentration. The analysis 
of the broad array of characteristics and functions of markets as eco-
nomic institutions enables the analysis of the emergence of the market 
as the result of a process of convergent and complementary innovations. 
Markets emerge and consolidate as specialized institutions.7
From this viewpoint, the emergence of a viable market can be consid-
ered the result of an articulated, institutional process that deserves to be 
analyzed carefully. Markets are social institutions that perform a variety 
of functions and exhibit diff erent forms, organizations and characteristics. 
Moreover, markets are a dynamical construct.
Hence markets are being created, they emerge, occasionally their per-
formances and functions improve, yet they can decline. In other words, 
markets evolve (Richter, 2007).
In turn, the emergence of new specialized markets has an impact on the 
economic system. This leads us to appreciate the notion of ‘market’ origi-
nally proposed by Adam Smith, namely ‘a device that promotes division 
of labor, learning/innovation, and economic growth’.
An eff ort to understand the institutional characteristics of markets in a 
general context seems necessary in order to grasp all the implications of the 
creation of the new fi nancial markets associated with venture capitalism. 
The analysis of their emergence should be the center- piece in any theory 
of economic development nowadays: markets perform a central role not 
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only in the allocation of resources but also in promoting ‘knowledge- based 
growth’ (De Liso, 2006).
4.  THE EMERGENCE OF NASDAQ FOR VENTURE 
CAPITALISM
The creation of a surrogate market for knowledge where knowledge-
 intensive property rights can be traded as fi nancial products can be con-
sidered one of the key features and contributions of venture capitalism. 
The new fi nancial markets specialized in knowledge- intensive property 
rights are based on a new intermediation form that emerges from the 
mutual adaptation of diff erent groups of actors both on the supply and 
the demand side, and with the underlying institutional structure. This has 
led to a multilayer super- market such as NASDAQ, which enables partici-
pants to relate to a large number of markets for individual stocks simul-
taneously, thereby better coordinating their needs with the  capabilities 
off ered.
A new market may emerge when a set of previously isolated precursor 
transactions sparks an emergence process. For this to happen, a number 
of conditions are required. Frequently these will include pre- emergence 
processes of interaction and information fl ow among agents, together with 
experimentation and learning concerning product characteristics and user/
producer organization and strategy. Emergence may also require a criti-
cal mass of precursor transactions both to underpin the above- mentioned 
interactions, learning and experimental processes, and to enhance the 
expected ‘benefi ts’ derived from creating a new market.8 Moreover, the 
successful emergence of a new market may depend critically on the con-
verging action of agents towards emerging platforms able to providing the 
required dynamic coordination (Richardson, 1972, 1998).
The evolutionary process leading to the emergence of a new market is 
seen as an autocatalytic, cumulative process with positive feedback, or, 
alternatively, a process characterized by dynamic economies of scale. This 
process involves the creation and utilization of externalities that explain 
the acceleration of growth. The cumulative process does not end with crea-
tion of the new market; rather it continues afterwards at least for a time 
(provided that external conditions do not deteriorate).9
The new (more complex) structure created by the interaction among 
elementary components (fi rms and users) will, once it is emerged, posi-
tively further stimulate such components. This phenomenon provides us 
with an additional, and much less recognized, characteristic of ‘a market’: 
once created it will stimulate the creation of new fi rms.10
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The Phases of the Process
The emergence of the new fi nancial markets is the result of a continued 
process of convergent and complementary steps that can be visualized as 
comprising four phases.
Phase I. Bundling fi nance and competence with innovation
Since the early days, venture capital fi rms specialized in the provision of 
‘equity fi nance’ to new science- based startup companies as distinct from 
‘loans’, which were the prevailing product off ered by existing fi nancial 
institutions (banks). Equity fi nance was off ered to science- based startup 
companies bundled together with business services and management 
advice, management services, certifi cation and networking functions. This 
was exchanged for limited partnership. Limited partnership is a key ‘pre-
cursor’ dimension to the emergence of the new market. In the USA during 
the 1960s and 1970s, limited partnerships were the dominant form of 
organization for new science- based startup companies. Limited partner-
ship allowed for dilution of founder equity positions and a capital (jointly 
with the prevailing product) market orientation.
Gompers and Lerner (1999) stress the role at this stage of the chang-
ing features of intellectual property right regimes. The increasing depth, 
width and duration of patents has led to higher levels of appropriability for 
knowledge that is embodied in new science- based companies, and traded 
the form of knowledge- intensive property rights rather than bundled within 
large diversifi ed incumbents. Large incumbents were able to rely much less 
of the protection provided by intellectual property rights because of the 
advantages of existing barriers to entry that would delay the dissipation of 
innovation rents. Large incumbents, moreover, can take advantage of lead 
times and secrecy as eff ective mechanisms of knowledge appropriation. 
New science- based startup companies, on the other hand, need to disclose 
information about the advantages of their knowledge base: patents perform 
a key signaling function. The protection of hard intellectual property right 
regimes is much more important for science- based startup companies that 
are newcomers themselves. The radical changes in intellectual property 
right regimes introduced in the 1980s and 1990s clearly favored venture 
capitalism because they reduced for investors the levels of risks associated 
with the non- appropriability of the strong knowledge component of the 
intangible assets of the new science based fi rms (Hussinger, 2006).
Phase II. Knowledge- intensive property rights
Phase II is marked by the evolution of limited partnership as the leading 
form of organization of startup into into private stock companies based 
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upon knowledge- intensive property rights shares of the new science- based 
startup companies and other rights concerning the management of the 
company. Limited partnership converges progressively into stock- holding. 
The personal participation of partners in the startup declines and is sub-
stituted by the professional services of managers organized by venture 
capital companies. The new bundling of equity with managerial compe-
tence into knowledge- intensive property rights of science- based startup 
companies that can be traded can be considered the dominant (product) 
design that lies at the origin of what will become a new market. In this 
early phase, venture capital companies co- evolve with the  organization of 
the new science- based startup companies.
The development of venture capital companies and the growth of the 
syndications as a way to collect funds for new science- based startup com-
panies have played a key role in this phase. Private investors and fi nancial 
companies that had contributed to the fundraising activities for new 
companies were eager to elaborate exit strategies for collecting the value 
of the new fi rms after their creation and growth, and participate fully in 
the profi ts of the ‘blockbusters’. The search for ‘exit’ strategies acts as a 
powerful dynamic factor at this stage.
Phase III. Trading knowledge- intensive property rights in private markets
Exits took place principally through the sale of knowledge- intensive 
property rights in the so- called trade sales to individuals or organizations. 
These are ‘private transactions’. During the fi rst half of the 1970s we can 
observe the growing number of over- the- counter (OTC) initial off erings of 
knowledge- intensive property rights. Here a critical mass of transactions 
slowly builds up and triggers, through variation, a more systematic and 
focused search and experimentation process leading to the emergence of a 
public market.
Large companies become progressively aware of the important oppor-
tunities provided by the new small public companies whose shares are 
traded over the counter as a source of technological knowledge. Mergers 
and acquisitions increase as corporations rely more and more systemati-
cally upon the takeover of the new science- based companies, after initial 
public off ering (IPO), as a source of technological knowledge that has 
already been tested and proved to be eff ective. The acquisition of external 
knowledge, embodied in the new fi rms, complements and partly sub-
stitutes internal activities conducted intra muros within the traditional 
research laboratories. Specifi cally, incumbents rely on the new source of 
external technological knowledge as an intermediary input that can be 
combined with other internal knowledge sources.
Hence it is clear that the new, dedicated fi nancial markets implement 
M2283 - VIALE TXT.indd   112 20/4/10   10:14:06
 Venture capitalism and knowledge governance  113
a new central functionality in the economic system in terms of increased 
division of labor in the generation of new technological knowledge, and 
higher levels of specialization in the production of the bits of knowledge 
that each company is better able to command. From this viewpoint it is 
also clear that the new markets favor the coordination among diff erent 
fi rms specialized in the generation of complementary modules of knowl-
edge that can be exchanged and traded. The new fi nancial markets favor 
the reorganization of the generation of knowledge, away from high levels 
of internal vertical integration, towards open innovation architectures 
(Chesbrough, 2003). The changing organization of the generation of tech-
nological knowledge on the new fi nancial markets attracts increasing fl ows 
of fi rms on the demand side. Consequently, the growing demand of the 
new knowledge- intensive property rights by large incumbents increases 
the frequency of transactions and hence the thickness of the new markets 
(Avnimelech and Teubal, 2004, 2006, 2008).
Phase IV. Emergence of a public capital market focused on IPOs
The increasing size of OTC exchanges led the National Association of 
Dealers to introduce an automatic quoting mechanism to report the prices 
and quantities of the private transactions. Eventually the mechanisms, 
better known by an acronym, evolved into a marketplace. NASDAQ 
became a new market for selling knowledge- intensive property rights to 
the public at large rather than only to private individuals or organizations. 
NASDAQ becomes the specialized market for IPOs of the shares of the 
new science- based startup companies nurtured by venture capital compa-
nies and funded with their assistance by groups of fi nancial investors.
Signifi cant adaptations of the institutional environment, for example 
modifi cations of the ERISA (Employment Retirement Income Security 
Act), including the 1979 amendment to the ‘prudent man’ rule governing 
pension fund investments in the USA (Gompers and Lerner, 2004, pp. 8, 
9) involved liberalization of the constraints on pension fund investment in 
the stock of new science- based startups.
In parallel, the increasing liberalization of international fi nancial and 
currency markets had the twin eff ect of increasing both the demand and 
the supply in the NASDAQ. On the demand side, a growing number of 
investment funds entered the NASDAQ to place their capital. On the 
supply side, the high levels of liquidity, the thickness of transactions and 
the low levels of volatility, together with the high quality of the profes-
sional services available in NASDAQ, attracted the entry of venture 
capital companies of other countries (in the Israeli case the dynamics is 
impressive) that eventually represented a large and growing share of the 
total fi gure of IPOs of science- based startup companies. An increasing 
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concentration of exchanges, a key feature of a marketplace, has been 
taking place at the global level (Bozkaya et al. 2008).
By means of global concentration, sparse, rare and occasional trans-
actions by a myriad of isolated and dispersed agents, scattered around 
many local markets, were progressively brought into the same physical 
and institutional context with clear advantages in terms of the number of 
 transactions that occur and hence can be compared and observed.
Here the analysis of Schmookler (1966) on the role of demand in pulling 
technological innovation applies to explain the fi nal stages of this process 
of institutional change. Schmookler found strong empirical evidence of a 
link between capital- good market size (as indicated by gross investment) 
on the one hand and capital- sgood improvement inventions (as indicated 
by patents on capital goods, with a lag) on the other (Schmookler, 1966). 
Moreover, when it comes to explain the distribution of patents on capital-
 goods improvement inventions across industries, ‘demand’ overrides any 
diff erences in the ‘supply’ side of inventions. His analysis suggests that the 
emergence of new product markets in general and not only capital- goods 
markets will, through a ‘demand’ eff ect, induce improvement inventions in 
the underlying product and process technology.
Here it is clear that demand for the new knowledge- intensive property 
rights by investment funds, pension funds and eventually family pulled 
the fi nal diff usion of NASDAQ with a snow- ball eff ect in terms of the 
overall level of transactions. The new levels of mass transactions favored 
the frequency of IPOs and attracted qualifi ed professional and fi nancial 
companies specialized in market management. This in turn led to substan-
tial increase in the thickness of the markets, reduction in volatility and 
 eventually global concentration of exchanges.
The concentration of transactions, the thickness of the new markets, 
and, most important, the ensuing recurrence of transactions on individual 
stocks have important eff ects in terms of reduction of volatility. The entry 
on the demand side of large investment funds, pension funds and ulti-
mately even private investors has the important eff ect of providing large 
fl ows of transactions on the shares of individual companies. The size of 
the new fi nancial markets makes it possible to better manage uncertainty 
by means of the distribution of small bets across a variety of actors and of 
fi rm- specifi c equity markets.
In the previous phases, characterized by the preponderance, on the 
demand side, of large incumbents searching for new science- based compa-
nies able to complement their internal knowledge base in order to organize 
takeovers and subsequent delisting, transactions on individual stocks were 
sporadic, with high levels of volatility.
This enables NASDAQ to become an effi  cient mechanism for the 
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identifi cation of the correct value of knowledge- intensive property rights. 
This in turn leads it to perform the key function of appreciation of the 
large share of intangible assets in the value of the new science- based 
 companies (Campart and Pfi ster, 2007; Bloch, 2008).
The expansion/transformation of NASDAQ is clearly the result of a 
cumulative process with positive feedback involving a number of proc-
esses that make the market more and more attractive to increasingly 
larger sets of agents (both demand side and supply side). The reasons 
are similar to some extent to those invoked to explain the dynamics of 
venture capital or cluster emergence. The new sets of agents that partici-
pate in the new markets include specialized agents providing services to 
investors or companies, for example investment banks, brokers, consult-
ants, and so on; specialized new intermediaries such as venture capital/
private equity funds, fi nancial investors and so on. The enhanced volume 
that their entry induces further reduces transaction costs, which further 
increases the thickness and frequency of transactions. This also reduces 
uncertainty to individual investors as well as market volatility, and so 
on.
Thus, once a new market emerges (e.g. as a result of venture capitalism) 
and begins to grow, a point may be reached when the private ‘benefi t’ 
from developing a disruptive technology may become such as to induce 
‘technology suppliers’ like science- based startup companies to undertake 
disruptive technology development. This in turn enabled exploitation of 
signifi cant economies of scale and scope, and a momentum for further 
expansion (dynamic economies or cumulative processes with positive feed-
back). NASDAQ thereby eventually became the market for transactions 
on knowledge- intensive property rights in general. NASDAQ in eff ect 
became a ‘super- market’ for products generating income streams for the 
general public.
The emergence of venture capitalism, defi ned as the combination of 
venture capital companies able to screen, fund and assist the growth of 
new science- based startup companies complemented by a dedicated fi nan-
cial market specialized in the transactions of their property rights, marks 
important progress in knowledge governance. Venture capitalism has 
signifi cant advantages with respect to the system architecture prevailing 
in the second part of the twentieth century, when innovations were mainly 
selected, developed and commercialized by existing incumbent companies. 
The new, dedicated fi nancial markets seem better able than the previous 
knowledge governance mechanisms to appreciate the economic value 
of technological knowledge, to signal the new directions of technologi-
cal change, to select the new blueprints and, most important, to provide 
better incentives respectively to ‘inventors’, to venture capital fi rms and to 
M2283 - VIALE TXT.indd   115 20/4/10   10:14:06
116 The capitalization of knowledge
investors in directing their resources and capabilities towards the genera-
tion and use of new technological knowledge.
The new, dedicated fi nancial markets seem able to reduce the limita-
tions of both the hierarchical corporate and the credit- based polyarchic 
model based upon the banking system. They also seem able to combine 
the advantages of screening radical innovations of polyarchic decision-
 making with the advantages stemming from direct participation in the 
profi ts of new outperforming science- based startup that are characteristic 
of the equity provision of fi nance to innovation, typical of the corporate 
model.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Venture capitalism can be understood as a new mechanism for the govern-
ance of technological knowledge that is the result of a system dynamics 
where a variety of complementary and localized innovations introduced 
by heterogeneous agents aligned and converged towards a collective plat-
form. The new mechanism has improved the governance of technological 
knowledge within economic systems, through the combination of new 
science- based startups and new, dedicated fi nancial markets specialized 
in the transactions of knowledge- intensive property rights. Hence it has 
reshaped the prime mechanism by which the generation of new knowledge 
can lead to economic growth.
The relationship between technological and institutional change is 
strong and allows for bidirectional causality. Technological change can 
be considered the cause of institutional change, as much as institutional 
change can be considered at the origin of technological change. A large lit-
erature has explored the view that the discontinuities brought about by the 
radical technological breakthrough that took place in the late 1970s with 
the emergence of the new technological systems based upon information 
and communication technologies (ICT) can be thought to be at the origin 
of the progressive demise of the Chandlerian model of innovation centered 
on large corporations. Venture capitalism has been often portrayed as the 
consequence of the ICT revolution.
In this work we have articulated the alternative hypothesis. The emer-
gence of venture capitalism based upon new dedicated fi nancial markets 
specialized in the trading of knowledge- intensive property rights and hence 
in the systematic appreciation of new science- based startups can be consid-
ered a major institutional innovation in the governance of technological 
knowledge and as such a key factor in hastening the pace of introduction 
of more radical technological innovations.
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The analysis has highlighted the advantages of the new mechanism 
of knowledge governance based upon venture capital companies able to 
screen, fund and implement new science- based startup companies and new 
dedicated fi nancial markets specialized in knowledge- intensive property 
rights. It has also shown how the emergence of such new markets has been 
the result of a complex process of system dynamics where a plurality of 
actors and interests aligned and converged towards a common platform 
able to integrate and valorize the complementarities between their dif-
ferent profi t functions. The emergence of the new fi nancial markets can 
be considered as a major institutional innovation that is likely to have 
 important eff ects on the pace of technological change.
Following our line of investigation, we can summarize the main 
reasons why the process of transformation of radical inventions into new 
product markets is likely to become more certain, frequent and routinized 
under venture capitalism: (1) increased numbers of new science- based 
startup companies with radical inventions; (2) new systemic and generic 
mechanisms of direct or indirect transformation of such inventions into 
new product markets; (3) the eff ect of new markets and more rapid 
market growth on invention, including radical (both disruptive and non-
 disruptive) inventions; (4) the possible emergence of unbundled markets 
for technological improvements.
Venture capitalism creates a cumulative process of innovation- based 
economic growth. The combination of continued generation of new 
opportunities and the mechanism for ‘unlocking’ the system from poten-
tial, strong past dependence, is evidence that venture capitalism could 
become a feature of sustainable innovation- based growth.
NOTES
 1. Morris Teubal acknowledges the funding and support of ICER (International Center 
for Economic Research) where he was a Fellow in 2005 and 2008 and the Prime (NoE) 
Venture Fun Project. Preliminary versions have been presented at the Fifth Triple Helix 
Conference ‘The capitalization of knowledge: cognitive, economic, social and cultural 
aspects’ organized in Turin by the Fondazione Rosselli, May 2005 and the following 
workshops: ‘The emergence of markets and their architecture’, jointly organized by 
CRIC (University of Manchester) and CEPN- IIDE (University Paris 13) in Paris, May 
2006; ‘Instituting the market process: innovation, market architectures and market 
dynamics’ held at the CRIC of the University of Manchester, December 2006; ‘Search 
regimes and knowledge based markets’ organized by the CEPN Centre d’Economie de 
Paris Nord at the MSH Paris Nord, February 2008.
 2. So far, this contribution complements and integrates Antonelli and Teubal (2008), 
which focuses on the emergence of knowledge- intensive property rights.
 3. Concerning the nature and function of markets, again following Coase: ‘Markets are 
institutions that exist to facilitate exchange, that is they exist in order to reduce the 
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cost of carrying out exchange transactions. In Economic Theory which assumes that 
transaction costs are non- existent markets have no function to perform’ (Coase, 1988, 
p. 7); and ‘when economists do speak about market structure, it has nothing to do with 
markets as an institution, but refers to such things as the number of fi rms, product dif-
ferentiation and the like, the infl uence of the social institutions that facilitate exchange 
being completely ignored’.
 4. Coase (1988) discusses the elements comprising a market, e.g. the medieval fairs and 
markets that comprise both physical facilities and legal rules governing the rights and 
duties of those carrying out transactions. Modern markets will also involve collective 
organizations, that is technological institutes and mechanisms for the provision of 
market- specifi c public goods. They also require a critical mass of buyers and sellers, 
and institutions assuring standards and quality on the one hand and transparency of 
transactions and inter- agent information fl ow on the other.
 5. Marshall makes it clear that markets are themselves the product of a dynamic process: 
‘Originally a market was a public place in a town where provisions and other objects 
were exposed for sale; but the word has been generalized, so as to mean any body of 
persons who are in intimate business relations and carry on extensive transactions in 
any commodity. A great city may contain as many markets as there are important 
branches of trade, and these markets may or may not be localized. The central point 
of a market is the public exchange, mart or auction rooms, where the traders agree to 
meet and transact business. In London the Stock Market, the Corn Market, the Coal 
Market, the Sugar Market, and many others are distinctly localized; in Manchester the 
Cotton Market, the Cotton Waste Market, and others. But this distinction of locality 
is not necessary. The traders may be spread over a whole town, or region of country, 
and yet make a market, if they are, by means of fairs, meetings, published price lists, the 
post- offi  ce or otherwise, in close communication with each other’ (Marshall, 1920, pp. 
324–5).
 6. Markets can also signal new product or product feature requirements (‘unmet needs’) 
within the ‘product category’ being traded.
 7. Our agenda is therefore not only to defi ne and explain the role of markets but also to 
identify the processes of emergence of new markets. This will include analyzing the con-
ditions under which a set of ‘precursor’ transactions will not lead to the emergence of a 
new market. In terms of system dynamics, this could be termed ‘left- hand truncation’. 
Moreover, explaining emergence will require making reference to other variables, that 
is scale economies in building the market- place (Antonelli and Teubal, 2008).
 8. The benefi ts include savings in transaction costs that should cover the fi xed costs of 
creating and the variable costs of operating a new market (see above).
 9. The above framework suggests that failed market emergence could be the result of two 
general causes. One is failed selection processes resulting from too little search/experi-
mentation and/or inappropriate selection mechanisms due to institutional rigidity. 
The other is failure to spark or sustain an evolutionary cumulative emergence process 
(e.g. due to system failures that policy has not addressed). Not all radical inventions, 
even those leading to innovations and having potential, will automatically lead to new 
product markets.
10. Students of regional high- tech clusters such as Saxenian (1994) and Fornahl and 
Menzel (2004) have intuitively recognized the relevance of such dynamics, but not quite 
elaborated it.
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